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Introduction 
Orange County’s bankruptcy was an historical 
event. Municipal bankruptcies are  rare,  and 
Orange County’s was the largest case ever. At the 
time of its bankruptcy, the County was the fifth 
most populous county in the United States, with 
two and a half million residents. The county’s 
budget exceeded $3.7 billion, and its employees 
numbered about 18,000.1 Even among large municipal 
bankruptcies, the case was unique. Large cases 
typically involve declining urban centers, short 
on tax revenues and long on spending commitments. 
Orange County, by contrast, was a prosperous 
suburban county, and its financial demise was 
triggered by a risky investment strategy gone bad. 
The County treasurer oversaw a  leveraged 
investment pool that had lost $1.6 billion by the 
time of its bankruptcy filing.2 In addition, the 
County’s    financial    distress    had    direct 
1. See MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY 
BANKRUPTCY 7 (1998). 
2. See id. Of the $20 billion in investments, $13 billion was 
made with borrowed money. See id. at 90. 
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consequences for many other local government 
entities. The County invested not only its own 
money, but funds of other municipal  entities 
within Orange County3—including cities, school 
districts, sanitation and water districts, and the 
County’s employee retirement system.4 The County’s 
investment woes therefore placed many other 
municipal entities and their constituencies at 
risk. 
In addition to its financial ripple effects, 
the Orange County case implicated novel legal 
issues. One such issue concerns the eligibility 
of municipal entities to file for bankruptcy, a 
question that is determined by a mix of federal 
and state law. In particular, federal  law 
requires specific state authorization in order for 
a municipality to file. Federal bankruptcy law 
offers a chapter specifically designed for 
municipalities in financial distress. However, 
because of federal Constitutional concerns, a 
municipal entity may resort to bankruptcy only 
with the authorization of its state. 
This federal requirement of state authorization 
derives from the Constitutional principle that the 
federal government may not interfere with states’ 
internal governance. Federal law must respect 
states’ sovereignty over their political 
subdivisions. So while federal law offers a 
municipal bankruptcy process, the state 
authorization requirement leaves to each state the 
final say over whether and which of its political 
subdivisions may have access to this process. 
Together with certain Bankruptcy Code provisions,5 
each state’s authorization statute sets the 
conditions under which its municipal entities will 
be eligible for federal bankruptcy. This Article 
focuses on California’s authorization provision. 
The states have taken varying approaches in 
managing their municipalities’ access to 
bankruptcy. Some states provide blanket 




3. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
4. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 95. 
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bankruptcy for their municipal entities without 
qualifications or conditions.6 At least one state 
flatly prohibits municipal bankruptcy  filings.7 
Some states impose preconditions to filing—for 
example, prior approval of state officials for the 
bankruptcy filing or the plan of adjustment, or 
state appointment of a trustee.8 Many states have 
no statute on municipal bankruptcy at all.9 
The existing California law provides fairly 
broad authorization. However, the current statute 
needs both technical and substantive revision. 
Enacted in 1949, the statute is obsolete insofar 
as it references a federal bankruptcy statute that 
has been superseded. More importantly, as a 
substantive matter, the broad authorization may be 
inappropriate. Given the sheer number and various 
different types of municipal entities that now 
exist in California—from irrigation districts to 
investment pools—as well as modern methods of 
municipal finance, broad and indiscriminate access 
to municipal bankruptcy is inadvisable. This 
Article proposes a reform of California’s 
authorizing statute for municipal bankruptcy 
filings. 
Having surveyed other states’ approaches,10 and 
having reviewed recent municipal financial crises—
including that of Orange County—I ultimately 
recommend a system of discretionary access, in 
which the governor holds discretionary power  to  




6. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 35-603 (2001); TEX. LOC. GOV’T 
CODE § 140.001 (2002). One commentator notes that fourteen states 
have enacted such blanket authorization statutes. See Daniel J. 
Freyberg, Note, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State 
Authorization to be a Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches 
to Municipal Insolvency—and What Will States Do Now?, 23 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 1001, 1008 n.66 (1997). A simple count of 
authorization statutes by itself, however, may oversimplify. See 
infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
7. See GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 (2001). Iowa allows a municipal 
filing only when the municipality has been rendered insolvent as 
a result of a debt involuntarily incurred. See IOWA CODE §§ 
76.16, 76.16A (2002). 
8. See infra Part IV. 
9. See Freyberg, supra note 2, at 1009 and n.70. 
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municipality’s access to bankruptcy. The Article 
is organized as follows. Parts I and II provide 
background.11  Part I describes the general issue 
of state authorization and the interaction of 
state and federal law that is required to satisfy 
federal Constitutional concerns. Part II 
describes municipal bankruptcy, highlighting its 
salient features. In Part III, I discuss the 
broad factors that should be considered in 
designing a system of state authorization, and I 
attempt to weigh those various factors in 
formulating a recommendation. In Part IV, I 
discuss the range of possible approaches, I 
describe my proposal, and I discuss the politics 
of legislating such a proposal. Part V addresses 
specific questions concerning the scope of the 
definition of “municipality” under the Bankruptcy 
Code.12 
 
I. State Authorization and Federal 
Constitutional Concerns 
The basic purpose for federal municipal 
bankruptcy law—Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy 
Code13—is the same as for private corporations 
reorganizing under Chapter 11: to allow the 
debtor a breathing spell from  creditors’ 
collection efforts and to enable it to formulate a 
repayment plan with creditors.14 However, because 
municipalities and private corporations are quite 
different creatures, and because of Constitutional 
constraints that are implicated with municipal 
bankruptcy, Chapter 9 operates very differently 
from Chapter 11. In particular, a municipality 
may resort to bankruptcy only with the specific 
authorization  of  its  state,  but  once  in 
 
 
11. Readers familiar with federal municipal bankruptcy law and 
the general problem of state authorization may wish to skip 
directly to Part IV. 
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). This statute 
is hereafter referred to as the “Bankruptcy Code.” Unless 
otherwise specified, all statutory references herein shall be to 
the current version of the Bankruptcy Code. 
13. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
14. See In re Addison Community Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 649 
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bankruptcy, the municipal debtor is subject to 
many fewer constraints than its private corporate 
counterpart, both in terms of operations and in 
formulating and achieving court approval of a 
repayment plan. 
 
A. Federal Constitutional Concerns 
Federal municipal bankruptcy law must tread a 
careful line. Federal bankruptcy law provides a 
municipal debtor with the power to bind a creditor 
to a plan of adjustment without its consent. 
While granting this power, bankruptcy law must at 
the same time respect the states’ sovereign powers 
over their municipal entities. Therefore, 
bankruptcy law and bankruptcy courts cannot 
interfere with the governance or management of a 
municipal debtor. Understanding this balancing 
act helps to explain the role of state 
authorization in the federal scheme. 
The Constitution empowers Congress “to 
establish uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies.”15 The imprimatur of federal 
bankruptcy law is critical to enabling a municipal 
debtor to bind its creditors to a plan of 
adjustment because the Constitution specifically 
reserves to Congress the power to impair 
contracts, and specifically prohibits to the 
states.16     “Only federal law can give the type of 
 
 
15. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
16. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10. cl. 1. This Constitutional 
provision has been held not to create an absolute prohibition 
against state laws modifying contractual obligations in some 
exigent circumstances. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of 
Asbury Park, N.J., 316 U.S. 502 (1942); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n 
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933); Ropico, Inc. v. City of New 
York, 425 F.Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). However, section 903 of 
the Bankruptcy Code was enacted specifically to preempt state 
bankruptcy laws. It provides in part: “[A]  state  law 
prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of [its] 
municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to 
such composition.” 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (1994). The legislative 
history explains: 
State adjustment  acts have been held to be valid, but a 
bankruptcy law under which the bondholders of a municipality are 
required to surrender or cancel their obligations should be 
uniform throughout the States, as the bonds of almost every 
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relief afforded by chapter 9.”17 
Chapter 9 in effect authorizes municipalities 
in financial distress to employ the federal power 
to impair contracts for the purpose of effecting 
municipal debt adjustments. At the same time, 
however, federal law must respect the sovereign 
powers guarantied to the states by the Tenth 
Amendment. “The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the states, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people.”18 Central to 
states’ sovereignty is their power to govern the 
affairs of their municipalities. Therefore, 
federal law and federal bankruptcy courts cannot 
attempt to intervene directly in municipal 
management or operations, a sphere that falls 
squarely within the province of the respective 
states. 
 
B. The Federal Requirement of State Authorization 
The current Chapter 9 is the result of a 
history of Constitutional and Congressional debate 
over the proper allocation of power with respect 
to municipal debt adjustment. Section 109(c)(2), 
requiring specific state authorization for 
municipal bankruptcy filings, is a product of this 
debate. It “has roots in the constitutional 
principle that the federal government may not 
interfere with the internal governance of a state 
or its political subdivisions.”19 A municipality 
may resort to federal bankruptcy law only with 
proper authorization from the state. 
The current version of Section 109(c)(2) was 
 
 
creditor be found to accept such an adjustment without his 
consent. 
H.R. Rep. No. 2246, 79th  Cong. 2d. Sess. 4 (1946).  The provision 
was passed in order to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Faitoute, 316 U.S. 502, which upheld a New Jersey statute 
authorizing state adjustment plans for insolvent municipalities 
to bind creditors without their consent. 
17. In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688, 694 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. 1991) (citing U. S. v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938)). 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
19. Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go 
Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. 
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passed as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1994.20 It requires specific state authorization 
for a municipality to file for bankruptcy. In 
order for a municipality to be eligible  for 
Chapter 9, it must be 
specifically authorized, in its capacity as a 
municipality or by name, to be a debtor under 
such chapter by State law, or by a governmental 
officer or organization empowered by State law to 
authorize such entity to be a debtor under such 
chapter.21 
Prior to 1994, only general state authorization 
was  required.22 This general authorization 
provision basically reiterated the analogous 
provision from the bankruptcy statute that 
preceded the current Bankruptcy Code. Section 84 
of the Bankruptcy Act stated that “[a]ny State’s 
political subdivision . . . which is generally 
authorized to file a petition under this chapter 
by the legislature . . . is  eligible  for 
relief.”23 
Courts construing this general authorization 
requirement reached inconsistent results. Some 
construed it quite liberally, finding that it 
“should be broadly construed to provide 
municipalities maximum access to Chapter 9 within 
the constitutional limitations of the Tenth 
Amendment.”24 For example, one court held that 
general authority was inferred from a 
municipality’s authority to sue and be sued, to 
incur debts, and to negotiate contracts  that 
create obligations and debts.25    Other courts were 
 
 
20. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994). 
21. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1994). 
22. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988) (repealed 1994). 
23. Act of April 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260 (codified at 11 
U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (Supp. 1976)). 
24. In re Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 
B.R. 60, 73 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994). 
25. See In re Villages at Castle Rock Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145 
B.R. 76, 82 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). One court found that general 
authority was “sufficiently implied through a grant of 
responsibility over fiscal matters combined with a grant of 
general discretionary powers to implement the  powers 
enumerated.” Id. (citing In re Villages at Castle Rock Metro. 
Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76, 82 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990)). General 
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more restrained in finding general authority, 
refusing to infer authority from a general grant 
of powers. For instance, the authority of a 
transit district to sue and be sued was deemed by 
one court to be insufficient to infer authority to 
file bankruptcy.26 
Congress responded to the confusion by amending 
Section 109(c)(2) to require specific state 
authorization. 
 
C. California’s Authorization Statute: Government Code 
Section 53760 
Government Code Section 53760 is California’s 
current general statute authorizing municipal 
bankruptcy filings. It provides: 
Any taxing agency or instrumentality of this 
State, as defined in Section 81 of the act of 
Congress entitled ‘An act to establish a uniform 
system of bankruptcy throughout the United 
States,’ approved July 1, 1898, as amended, may 
file the petition mentioned in Section 83 of the 
Act and prosecute to completion all proceedings 




own finances. See In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688, 693-97 
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); In re City of Wellston, 43 B.R. 348 
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984). It was inferred from broad general 
powers of a municipality to be a party to suits, to borrow money, 
to issue bonds, to refund any bond indebtedness, to manage, 
control and supervise all of the business of district, and to 
exercise all rights and powers necessary or incidental to or 
implied from such powers. See In re Villages at Castle Rock 
Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76, 82 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). 
General authority was inferred from a statute vesting municipal 
districts with “all the powers necessary and requisite of the 
accomplishment for the purpose for which such district is 
created, capable of being delegated by the legislature . . . . 
The district is empowered to do all acts necessary, proper or 
convenient in the exercise of the powers granted herein.” In re 
Pleasant View Utility Dist. , 24 B.R. 632 (Bankr M.D. Tenn. 1982) 
(quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-82-306 (1980)), leave to appeal 
denied, 27 B.R. 552 (M.D.Tenn. 1982). 
26. See In re Westport Transit District, 165 B.R. 93, 98 
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1994). See also In re Carroll Township 
Authority, 119 B.R. 61 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990), in which the court 
relied on Congressional legislative history to conclude that some 
affirmative action by the state was required in order to 
demonstrate its authorization.  See id. at 63. 
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Another provision of the Government Code, 
Section 43739, speaks specifically to bankruptcy 
filings by certain cities. It states: 
Any city authorized to refund its indebtedness 
pursuant to this article may file a petition 
under any bankruptcy law of the United States. 
If the refunding of the city indebtedness is 
authorized in the bankruptcy proceeding, the city 
may refund its indebtedness pursuant to this 
article.28 
Both provisions were enacted in 1949, when only 
general state authorization was required. They 
both seem to provide fairly broad authorization 
for California municipal entities to file for 
bankruptcy. 
As I discuss below, Section 53760 should be 
substantively revised to limit access based on the 
governor’s discretion. As for Section 43739, it 
should probably be eliminated, so that only one 
general authorizing statute exists for all 
municipal entities. To the extent that particular 
types of entities may require special 
considerations in connection with bankruptcy 
authorization or filings, those specifics should 
also be contained in one general authorizing 
statute, and not scattered throughout the various 
substantive sections of the California code.29 
Section 53760 also refers to a federal 
bankruptcy statute that is no longer in effect. 
It refers to provisions of former Chapter IX of 
the Bankruptcy Act that were enacted in 1937 and 
superseded in 1976. Because of potential 
ambiguities that may arise from the obsolete 
statutory references,30   all statutory references 
 
 
Section 53761 provides that “[t]he State consents to  the 
adoption of Sections 81, 82, 83 and 84 by Congress and consents 
to their application to the taxing agencies and instrumentalities 
of this State.” Id. § 53761. This provision is probably 
unnecessary and adds nothing to the authorization contained in 
Section 53760. 
28. Id. § 43739. 
29. Under current law, for example, the Superintendent of 
Schools must authorize the bankruptcy petition for an insolvent 
school district.  See infra note 150. 
30. While the language appears to offer broad and explicit 
authority for local agencies to file bankruptcy, the court in 
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should reflect current law. 
The next Part provides an overview of Chapter 
9, its operation and its limitations.  The 
question of structuring a specific state 
authorization regime is taken up in the following 
Parts. 
 
II. Bankruptcy System Fundamentals 
In this Part, I describe Chapter 9. I first 
provide an overview of Chapter 9 and its benefits 
for the municipal debtor. I then discuss Section 
109(c) of the Code, which serves a gate keeping 
function with respect to Chapter 9 and from which 
the state authorization requirement derives. 
 
A. Benefits of Chapter 9 
For a municipality in financial distress, 
Chapter 9 provides immediate relief from creditor 
collection efforts and offers a framework within 
which to negotiate a restructuring of the 
municipality’s debt obligations. The immediate 
relief from creditors comes in the form of a stay 
against creditor collection efforts, which is 
triggered automatically upon the filing of a 
Chapter 9 petition.31 This relief enables the 
municipality to avoid financial and operational 
collapse, enabling it instead to continue to 
provide public services to its residents  and 
others while negotiating a plan of debt adjustment 
with its creditors. While I briefly describe 
other salient features of Chapter 9 as well—the 
ability to deal with unfavorable contracts and the 
negotiation of the plan of adjustment—I focus 
particular attention on the automatic stay and 
invocation of bankruptcy relief, which may have 
particular relevance for the structuring of the 




the court decided that OCIP was neither a municipality under 
federal law, nor specifically authorized under state law, because 
it did not fall within the laundry list of agencies and 
instrumentalities enumerated in Section 81 of the 1937 Act. See 
In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 602 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1995). 









12 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53 
 
 
(1) The Automatic Stay and Invocation of Bankruptcy 
Relief 
As the Orange County bankruptcy illustrated, 
timely invocation of the automatic stay and other 
bankruptcy relief may be critical to the municipal 
debtor’s ability to stabilize its financial 
position. In that case, three disputes arose 
implicating the debtor’s ability to rely on the 
invocation of bankruptcy to protect assets from 
creditors. While the debtor was ultimately 
unsuccessful in two of these disputes, the novelty 
of the legal issues raised suggests that the final 
word has yet to be written on these questions. I 
make no attempt to resolve these novel bankruptcy 
questions, a project that is beyond the scope of 
this Article. Instead, I recount these disputes 
simply to illustrate the potential significance of 
timely invocation of municipal bankruptcy. 
Early in the case, the County hoped to rely on 
the automatic stay to block certain of its secured 
creditors from liquidating their collateral.32 
These secured creditors were investment banks with 
which the County had entered into sophisticated 
financial contracts called reverse repurchase 
agreements.33 As collateral for the County’s 
obligations under these reverse repurchase 
agreements, the investment bank creditors held 
County-owned securities. Shortly after the 
bankruptcy filing, these creditors liquidated 
their collateral, despite the fact that such a 
move might have been a violation of the automatic 
stay. While certain Bankruptcy Code provisions 
permit  such  creditor  action,34    it  is  unclear 
 
 
32. See County of Orange v. Nomura Securities Int’l, Inc., Adv. 
No. 94-02480 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.) (complaint dismissed). 
33. A reverse repurchase agreement is essentially a secured 
loan. The County borrowed money to invest in securities, using 
securities it already owned as collateral for these loans. The 
County was obligated to “repurchase” the collateral at a fixed 
date and price, in effect retiring the loans. The interest rate 
is simply built into the repurchase price. Failure to repurchase 
is similar to a loan default, and entitles the other party—the 
“lender”—to foreclose on the collateral. See generally PHILIPPE 
JORION, BIG BETS GONE BAD: DERIVATIVES AND BANKRUPTCY IN ORANGE COUNTY 30- 
32 (1995). 
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whether these provisions apply in municipal 
bankruptcy.35 The issue was ultimately mooted by 
the County’s decision to liquidate its investment 
pool securities portfolio shortly after the 
bankruptcy filing.36 
A second dispute over the debtor’s assets 
involved the rights of holders of the County’s tax 
revenue anticipation notes (TRANS) with respect to 
certain pledged tax revenues. In its resolution 
approving the County’s $200,000,000 borrowing via 
issuance of the TRANS, the County Board of 
Supervisors also pledged certain future tax and 
other unrestricted revenues as security for the 
TRANS.37 The resolution specified a schedule of 
anticipated revenues that were to be set aside as 
they were received, in order to provide the 
promised  collateral.38 However, the County 
declared bankruptcy after only the first three 
set-asides had been made, and it took the 
plausible position that the invocation of 
bankruptcy cut off the TRANS holders’ rights to 
any post-bankruptcy revenues or set-asides.39 
Ordinarily, a secured creditor’s prepetition 
consensual lien does not extend to property 




of securities agreements by nondebtor party, notwithstanding 
certain provisions of Code, including automatic stay provision). 
35. While § 901(a) contains a laundry list of Bankruptcy Code 
provisions that explicitly apply in Chapter 9, see 11 U.S.C. § 
901(a), the provisions relating to liquidation of securities 
agreements and similar financial contracts, see supra note 34, 
are not included in the list. The National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission (the “NBRC”) has recommended that these provisions 
be specifically made applicable to Chapter 9 through their 
inclusion in Section 901(a). See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY 
REVIEW COMMISSION 991 (1997) [hereinafter NBRC REPORT]. In addition, 
a provision so amending Section 901(a) is included in the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, which as of this writing is 
pending in Congress. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, § 502, 
S. 420, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 502 (2001). 
36. See JORION, supra note 33, at 104. 
37. See Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P. v. County of Orange (In re 
County of Orange), 179 B.R. 185, 188 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995), 
rev’d on other grounds and remanded by 189 B.R. 499 (C.D. Cal. 
1995). 
38. See id. 
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bankruptcy petition.40 Therefore, the prompt 
invocation of bankruptcy may enable the debtor to 
terminate secured creditors’ rights relating, for 
example, to a stream of income or other assets, 
thereby preserving unencumbered assets for the 
estate, improving the debtors’ prospects for 
rehabilitation, and enhancing recoveries for 
general unsecured creditors. 
However, while the prepetition secured creditor 
is generally not entitled to postpetition 
collateral, it is unclear how this rule applies to 
a municipality’s pledge of future tax revenues to 
secure its TRANS obligations.41 The bankruptcy 
court agreed with the County that its pledge was a 
“security interest,” and therefore that the 
rights of the TRANS holders were cut off at the 
time of the bankruptcy filing.42 However, the 
district court reversed on appeal, finding that 
the pledge constituted a statutory lien that 
survived the bankruptcy filing.43 Therefore, the 
lien rights of TRANS holders continued in the 
County’s future revenues as originally scheduled, 
and were not cut off by the bankruptcy. 
A third dispute involved the Orange County 
Investment Pool (OCIP)44 and the claims of its 
participants, who wished to withdraw their funds 
as the County and OCIP slid into financial 
distress. OCIP was an investment pool started by 
the then-treasurer of Orange County, Robert L. 
 
 
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a). 
41. This issue does not arise with respect to revenue bonds, as 
to which the lien on special revenues survives the bankruptcy 
filing. See id. § 928(a). The TRANS, however, were general 
obligation bonds. See Alliance Capital Management, 179 B.R. at 
191 n.17. 
42. See Alliance Capital Mgmt., 179 B.R. at 194. 
43. See Alliance Capital Mgmt., 189 B.R. at 501. The NBRC 
recommends an amendment to the Code to allow similar treatment 
for TRANS as the Code currently provides for revenue bonds. The 
pledge of tax revenues would survive in bankruptcy, but—unlike 
revenue bonds—would be subject to the municipal debtor’s use for 
“necessary municipal services.” See NBRC REPORT, supra note 35, 
at 999. 
44. The financial chaos associated with OCIP is by now well 
known. For a description of the background and state law 
authorization for OCIP, see In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 
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Citron. Under California law, certain government 
entities could choose to deposit their excess 
funds into the county treasury for investment by 
the county treasurer. Other government entities 
were required to handle their excess funds this 
way.45 From these funds received by the County 
treasury, Citron created OCIP by combining the 
funds into several pools for investment purposes.46 
By 1994, OCIP held $7.6 billion in investments for 
190 municipal entities.47 
Because it was initially unclear whether OCIP 
could be a Chapter 9 debtor48 and who owned the 
OCIP funds in bankruptcy, it was also unclear 
whether pool participants had immediate rights to 
the funds or whether the automatic stay precluded 
their withdrawals. If the County held only as 
trustee for the various pool participants, then 
those trust funds belonged to the beneficiaries, 
not the County. Under this characterization, such 
funds would not have been subject to the claims of 
County creditors, and the beneficiary-participants 
would not have been subject to the automatic stay 
with respect to these funds. The bankruptcy court 
ultimately found that, despite state law creating 
a trust relation between the county and the pool 
investors, the funds belonged to the County as a 
result of the commingling of the assets in the 
pool.49 While this decision did not arise in the 
automatic stay context, one of the consequences of 
this ruling is that the automatic stay would have 
prevented pool participants from withdrawing their 
funds without County approval. 
While the Orange County case highlights the 
potential need for timely invocation of municipal 
bankruptcy and the automatic stay, it should be 




45. See id. 
46. See id. at 596-97. 
47. See id. 
48. The bankruptcy court ultimately decided that OCIP did not 
qualify as a municipality under federal bankruptcy law, and was 
therefore ineligible for Chapter 9. See id. at 594. See also 
infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
49. See County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 191 B.R. 
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insofar as it involved an investment pool. The 
first and third issues described above arose only 
because of OCIP operations. While similar 
investment pool-related municipal bankruptcies are 
not out of the question,50 the run-of-the-mill 
municipal entity does not operate a hedge fund on 
the side, so the creditor collection issues will 
be more straightforward. For these municipal 
entities, immediate invocation of bankruptcy may 
not be as critical as for private businesses or 
counties running investment pools. 
As a practical matter, creditors of traditional 
municipal debtors—school districts, hospital 
districts, and the like—have relatively few 
collection devices at their disposal compared to 
creditors of private entities. Aside from the 
securities-related issues raised in Orange County, 
municipal property is generally not subject to 
creditor seizure to satisfy municipal debt. One 
could easily imagine the social and political 
chaos that would ensue upon the dismemberment of a 
municipal entity as creditors raced to seize the 
municipality’s assets.51 The primary  creditor 
remedy available upon the municipal borrower’s 
default is a state court action for mandamus, by 
which a court orders the municipal debtor to 
exercise its taxing power to raise the revenue 
necessary to pay the defaulted debt.52 The 
automatic stay precludes further pursuit of this 
remedy as well. 
 
(2) Dealing with Unfavorable Contracts 
For some municipalities, financial distress may 




50. Despite the spectacular misfortunes of OCIP, investment 
pools are now a fairly common phenomenon in California municipal 
finance, as cities and counties search for new revenue sources in 
times of relative scarcity. Investment pools are quite different 
from other more traditional municipal entities. Their operations 
and obligations are different, and therefore financial distress 
related to an investment pool raises issues quite different from 
the issues arising out of the bankruptcy of more traditional 
entities. 
51. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 19, at 429. 
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contractual obligations, as well as its debt 
obligations. Chapter 9 provides a tool for 
accomplishing this, allowing a municipality to 
reject or renegotiate executory contracts.53 
Obligations to employees under collective 
bargaining agreements, for example, may require 
modification, as the Orange County case54 and the 
bankruptcy of the San Jose Unified School District 
in 1983 illustrate.55 
 
(3) Negotiating the Plan of Adjustment 
The ultimate goal for the municipal debtor in 
Chapter 9 is to reach agreement with creditors 
over the adjustment of municipal debts. Typical 
debt adjustments include extending the maturity of 
particular debt obligations or reducing the 
interest rate or principal balance. Comprehensive 
adjustment is accomplished through a plan of 
adjustment confirmed by the bankruptcy court.56 
Confirmation enables the debtor, with the 
requisite creditor majorities,57 to bind dissenting 
minority creditors to the terms of the plan of 
adjustment. While the requirements for 
confirmation are numerous, the most significant 
general requirements are that the plan must be 
proposed in good faith,58 that all creditor classes 
impaired under the plan must accept the plan,59  and 
 
 
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994), which is made applicable to 
Chapter 9 by 11 U.S.C. § 901(a). 
54. See Orange County Employees Ass’n v. County of Orange, 179 
B.R. 177, 184-85 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). 
55. See Barry Winograd, San Jose Revisited: A Proposal for 
Negotiated Modification of Public Sector Bargaining Agreements 
Rejected Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 
231 (1985). One primary purpose for the ultimately unsuccessful 
bankruptcy filing of the city of Bridgeport, Connecticut, was the 
modification of its labor contracts. See Thomas Scheffey, 
Bridgeport Bankruptcy No ‘Slam Dunk Case’: Specialists Say 
Whether City Had Authority to File up in the Air in Historically 
Unprecedented Scenario, THE RECORDER, June 20, 1991, at 3. See 
generally W. Richard Fossey & John M. Sedor, In re Copper River 
School District: Collective Bargaining and Chapter 9 Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 133 (1989). 
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 943. 
57. See id. §§ 901(a), 1126(c). 
58. See id. §§ 901(a), 1129(a)(3). 
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that the plan is in the best interests of 
creditors.60 
 
B. Debtor Control in Chapter 9 
By enabling a municipal debtor to impair 
contracts, Chapter 9 affords the debtor 
significant leverage over its creditors in 
negotiating debt adjustments. Because of 
considerations of state sovereignty, however, 
Chapter 9 imposes almost no countervailing 
restrictions or limitations on municipal 
operations or asset disposition. The municipal 
governance structure remains in place, free to 
operate without court or creditor interference. 
In effect, Chapter 9 provides the municipal debtor 
with a hefty club to wield over creditors, without 
giving creditors much in the way of protective 
mechanisms that are available in corporate and 
individual bankruptcy. On the other hand, 
municipalities’ access to Chapter 9 is much more 
restricted compared to other types of debtors 
filing under other chapters of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code 
serves this gate keeping function for municipal 
bankruptcy. This section briefly  illustrates 
debtor control in Chapter 9 by contrasting the 
municipal debtor’s position with the more familiar 
position of the corporate debtor under Chapter 11. 
The next section then discusses gate keeping under 
Section 109(c). 
Unlike Chapter 11, the scope of federal court 
authority over a municipal debtor is quite 
limited. Sections 903 and 904 of the Bankruptcy 
Code capture the limited approach of Chapter 9. 
Section 903 provides: “This chapter does not 
limit or impair the power of a State to control, 
by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or 
in such State in the exercise of the political or 




down over the objection of an impaired class. See id. § 1129(b). 
However, cram down in Chapter 9 works a little differently from 
Chapter 11.  See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 943.03[1][f] (15th  ed. 
rev’d 1999). 








April 2002] AFTER ORANGE COUNTY 19 
 
 
including expenditures for such exercise.”61 
Section 904 clarifies: 
Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless 
the debtor consents or the plan so provides, the 
court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in 
the case or otherwise, interfere with 
(1) any of the political or governmental 
powers of the debtor; 
(2) any of the property or revenues of the 
debtor; or 
(3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any 
income-producing property.62 
While particular provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code constrain the Chapter 11 debtor’s operations 
and negotiating leverage with creditors, municipal 
debtors suffer no analogous constraints. Unlike 
the Chapter 11 debtor, the Chapter 9 debtor is 
free to use its assets without interference by the 
bankruptcy court.63 It need not fear that a 
bankruptcy trustee will be appointed to take 
control of operations.64 Its ability to borrow 
money postbankruptcy remains unconstrained.65 The 
debtor may employ and compensate professionals 
without prior court approval.66 Creditors may not 
place a municipality into involuntary bankruptcy.67 
They cannot force the municipal debtor’s 
liquidation.68 Nor are they guarantied a minimum 




61. Id. § 903. 
62. Id. § 904. 
63. See id. Compare id. § 363. 
64. Compare id. § 1104. A trustee can be appointed only for 
the limited purpose of pursing avoidance actions on behalf of the 
estate if the debtor refuses to do so.  See id § 926(a). 
65. Compare id. § 364. “Only when the municipality needs 
special authority, such as subordination of existing liens, or 
special priority for the borrowed funds, will the court become 
involved in the authorization.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. 394 (1977). 
66. Compare id. §§ 327-331. One confirmation requirement, 
however, is that “all amounts to be paid by the debtor or by any 
person for services or expenses in the case or incident to the 
plan have been fully disclosed and are reasonable.” Id. § 
943(b)(3). 
67. Compare id. § 303. 
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debtor’s reorganization plan.69 Creditors have no 
right to file their own plans; only the debtor may 
file a plan.70 The municipal debtor is probably 
also not subject to the limitations imposed on 
corporate debtors with respect to rejecting 
collective bargaining agreements or modifying 
retiree benefits.71 
In all these areas, municipal debtors enjoy 
more freedom from court oversight and more 
leverage over their creditors than do private 
business debtors in Chapter 11. 
 
C. Gate Keeping under Section 109(c) 
While municipal debtors enjoy far more leverage 
over creditors in bankruptcy than their private 
counterparts, access to municipal bankruptcy is 
also more restricted. The specific state 
authorization requirement under Section 109(c)(2) 
operates as a gate keeping device restricting 
access to municipal bankruptcy, one that is 
completely within the control of the various 
states. Section 109(c) enumerates  other 
eligibility requirements for Chapter 9 as well: 
An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this 
title if and only if such entity— 
(1) is a municipality; 
(2) is specifically authorized, in its 




69. There is a requirement that any plan be in the “best 
interests” of creditors, see id. § 943(b)(7), which in the 
context of corporate bankruptcy was historically interpreted to 
require that creditors receive as much under the plan as they 
would have in liquidation. That requirement for corporate 
bankruptcy is now reflected in Section 1129(a)(7). With a 
municipality, on the other hand, liquidation is not an option, so 
the best interest requirement in the Chapter 9 context cannot 
refer to liquidation values. Instead, the legislative history of 
Chapter 9 suggests that the test requires that creditors receive 
in bankruptcy at least what they would have received by virtue of 
a mandamus proceeding under state law to compel an increased tax 
levy by the municipality in order to pay off the debt. See 
McConnell & Picker, supra note 19, at 465-66 & n.178. 
70. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 941 with id. § 1121. 
71. Compare id. §§ 1113, 1114 respectively. See also Orange 
County Employees Ass’n v. County of Orange, 179 B.R. 177 (Bankr. 
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a debtor under such chapter by State law, or 
by a governmental officer or organization 
empowered by State law to authorize such 
entity to be a debtor under such chapter; 
(3) is insolvent; 
(4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such 
debts; and 
(5)(A) has obtained the agreement of 
creditors holding at least a majority in 
amount of the claims of each class that such 
entity intends to impair under a plan in a 
case under such chapter; 
(B) has negotiated in good faith with 
creditors and has failed to obtain the 
agreement of creditors holding at least a 
majority in amount of the claims of each 
class that such entity intends to impair 
under a plan in a case under such chapter; 
(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors 
because such negotiation is impracticable; 
or 
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor 
may attempt to obtain a transfer that is 
avoidable under section 547 of this title. 
Besides these requirements, the petition must 
have been filed in good faith.72 In order to 
provide context for the subsequent discussion 
concerning state authorization, I briefly describe 




Only municipalities are eligible for Chapter 9. 
A municipality is defined as a “political 
subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of 
a State.”73 “Political subdivision” includes 
counties, cities, towns, and the like,74 that 
exercise various sovereign powers such as the 
taxing power, the power of eminent domain, or the 




72. See id. § 921(c). 
73. Id. § 101(40). 
74. See In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 601 n.16 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1995). 
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instrumentality” includes  incorporated 
authorities, commissions, and similar public 
agencies organized for the purpose of 
constructing, maintaining, and operating revenue- 
producing enterprises. The term also includes 
local improvement districts, school districts, and 
the like, organized or created for the purpose of 
constructing, improving, maintaining,  and 
operating improvements, schools, ports, etc.76 
When a bankruptcy petition was filed on behalf 
of OCIP, the court dismissed the petition, finding 
that OCIP was neither a political subdivision nor 
a public agency. As to whether it was an 
instrumentality of the State, the court found that 
OCIP’s characteristics and objectives did not 
comport with those of entities historically 
identified as instrumentalities.77 Moreover, that 
OCIP was an instrumentality of the county did not 
make it an instrumentality of the State for 




A municipality must be insolvent to be eligible 
for Chapter 9. Insolvency in  the  municipal 
context is a bit different from insolvency in the 
context of private entities. A traditional 
comparison of assets and liabilities is not 
useful, given difficulties of valuing municipal 
 
 
76. See id. at 602-03. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. The court found that OCIP was unlike any of the 
several types of instrumentalities enumerated in the 1937 
Bankruptcy Act that was a predecessor to the current statute. 
The court further held that OCIP was not specifically authorized 
under California law to file for bankruptcy, since California’s 
authorization provision refers specifically to this same laundry 
list of instrumentalities from the superseded statute.  See id. 
79. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 59, at ¶ 900.02[2][a][iii]. 
Creditors also argued that OCIP was not an entity, and was 
therefore not eligible under Section 109(c). Creditors claimed 
that OCIP was merely a legal fiction created on the eve of 
bankruptcy for the purpose of filing a bankruptcy petition. See 
County of Orange, 183 B.R. at 599. The court found, however, 
that OCIP had a separate existence long before its bankruptcy, 
and that it was a governmental unit, which by definition 
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assets and the inability of creditors to force the 
liquidation of a municipality to satisfy their 
debts. For municipalities, insolvency is defined 
in Section 101(32)(C) to mean a “financial 
condition such that the municipality is (i) not 
generally paying its debts as they become due 
unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide 
dispute; or (ii) unable to pay its debts as they 
become due.”80 
The bankruptcy filing for the City of 
Bridgeport, Connecticut, was dismissed because the 
court found that the debtor was not insolvent.81 
The court clarified that the financial inability 
must be “imminent and certain, not merely a 
possibility or speculation.”82 This requirement 
operates as something of a screening device to 
assure that federal bankruptcy powers are not 
prematurely invoked to intrude on a municipality’s 
negotiation with its creditors and employees over 
finances.83 
 
(3) Good Faith 
In addition to the eligibility requirements 
spelled out in Section 109(c), the Code provides 
for the dismissal of any Chapter 9 petition not 
filed in good faith.84 For lack of any precedent 
construing this provision in Chapter 9, the Orange 
County court adopted the Ninth Circuit’s good 
faith test for Chapter 11 filings: “whether the 
debtor is attempting to unreasonably deter and 
harass its creditors or attempting to effect a 
speedy, efficient reorganization on a feasible 
basis.”85    In addition, “the purpose of the filing 
 
 
80. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (1994). 
81. See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 339 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. 1991). 
82. Id. at 337. 
83. Moreover, this and the prerequisite that the debtor have 
made at least some effort to negotiate with creditors to obtain 
their consent to a plan, see supra Part II[C], give some comfort 
to the municipal bond market that bankruptcy protection will not 
be too readily accessible.   See 6 COLLIER, supra note 59, at 
¶ 900.02[2][e]. 
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 921(c). 
85. In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 608 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
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must be to achieve objectives within the 
legitimate scope of the bankruptcy laws.”86 
 
* * * 
 
Having sketched the contours of Chapter 9 and 
the gate keeping function of Section 109(c), we 
turn to the question of designing an appropriate 
state authorization mechanism. 
 
III. Managing Access to Chapter 9: First 
Principles 
In this Part, I discuss basic considerations 
that should inform the design of a state law gate 
keeping device for municipal bankruptcy. In 
determining the proper role for the state in 
managing access to Chapter 9, I consider, among 
other things, competing interests in local 
autonomy versus statewide fiscal management, and 
the politics of municipal financial distress. In 
addressing the difficult trade-offs that must be 
made, it may be useful to distinguish large, 
multipurpose municipal entities—cities and 
counties—from smaller or more specialized 
entities—school or hospital or irrigation 
districts and the like. The former are generally 
the more complex, both politically and 
economically. For the bulk of the following 
discussion, cities and counties are our primary 
concern. Smaller and more specialized entities 
are separately considered at the end of this Part. 
In the next Part, I detail my recommendation. 
 
A. The Fundamental Tension: Statewide Impact of 
Bankruptcy v. Local Autonomy 
Resort to bankruptcy may have consequences not 
only for the filing entity; it may also affect 
borrowing costs for governmental borrowers 
statewide.87    It may have other negative effects as 
 
 
re Arnold, 806 F.2d 937, 939 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
86. County of Orange, 183 B.R. at 608. 
87. Moreover, the structuring of a system of state 
authorization may by itself affect borrowing costs in subtle 
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well. On the other hand, state involvement in 
municipal financial affairs may infringe on local 
autonomy and may hamper local efforts to address a 
fiscal crisis that requires timely and finely 
tuned action. 
In general, preservation of local autonomy is 
important. SB 349, which was passed in the 1995 
legislative session but vetoed by then-governor 
Wilson, would have created a Local Area Bankruptcy 
Committee (“LABC”), composed of the state 
Controller, Treasurer, and Director of Finance, 
that would decide on municipal bankruptcy 
authorization.88 Governor Wilson’s veto message 
concerning SB 349 expressed the sentiment that the 
bill “would inappropriately vest responsibility 
for local fiscal affairs at the state level, 
creating an instrument of state government to 
usurp the authority of local officials to decide 
the wisdom of a bankruptcy filing.”89 Moreover, 
official opponents of SB 349 included the 
California Municipal Treasurers Association and 
the Association of California Water Agencies.90 
State intervention in local affairs  should 
occur only in exceptional circumstances, and not 
without some specific purpose. In my  view, 
however, municipal financial distress is an 
exceptional occasion that begs for state 
involvement and may justify active intervention. 
Municipal financial distress generally implicates 
more than merely the local interests of the 
distressed entity. Bankruptcy may provide a 
municipality quick relief from certain of its debt 
obligations, but the municipality—and other state 
and local borrowers—will end up paying in the 
financial markets. Regardless of what route is 
chosen, the costs of default do not disappear. 
The municipal debt markets will respond to default 
by  raising  interest  rates,  not  only  for  the 
 
 
distress. For example, too liberal access to Chapter 9 may raise 
overall borrowing costs by forcing the financial markets to 
account for the general future possibility of municipal 
repudiation of debts. 
88. See S.B. 349, 1995-96 Sess. (Cal. 1995). 
89. S.B. 349 Veto (Sept. 30, 1996). 
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defaulting debtor in its attempts at future 
borrowing,91 but for other municipalities in the 
state, and to some extent for municipal borrowers 
in general.92 
In the aftermath of the Orange County 
bankruptcy, for instance, many California issuers 
of public debt were forced to resort to letters of 
credit in order to enhance the quality of their 
issues.93 “We all paid a penalty for Orange 
County. Orange County rocked and rolled the 
market. Some governments and markets with good 
reserves still paid a penalty in the 
marketplace.”94 According to one estimate, 
California local government entities issuing 




91. In June 1996, Orange County issued $880 million in recovery 
bonds to pay its prebankruptcy creditors and exit from 
bankruptcy. The bonds were priced to yield ten to twenty-five 
basis points more than similarly rated bonds, which translates 
into an extra $43.8 million in interest costs. Overall, the 
county paid about $60 million extra to borrow, including higher 
underwriting fees, higher returns to investors, and the costs of 
bond insurance.  See Debora Vrana, O.C. Bankruptcy All but Over, 
L. A. TIMES, June 6, 1996, at A1 (quoting Zane Mann, publisher of 
California Municipal Bond Advisor). 
92. Default on municipal bond indebtedness may have serious 
ramifications for the entire U.S. municipal bond market. General 
obligation bonds, for example, are simply unsecured debt 
obligations backed by the issuer’s “full faith and credit,” a 
commitment that the municipality will resort to its taxing powers 
if necessary to satisfy the debt. Bankruptcy signals the 
issuer’s dishonor of its full faith and credit commitment, which 
shakes the market’s confidence, not just with respect to the 
defaulting municipality but with respect to municipal issuers 
generally. 
93. See Arlene Jacobious, Thanks to Improving Fiscal Picture, 
L.A. County to Sell Unenhanced TRANS, THE BOND BUYER, July 17, 
1997, at 1 (quoting Maureen Sicotte, director of finance and 
investments for Los Angeles County). 
94. Id. Some market participants expected the State of 
California to step in to assure Orange County’s timely debt 
repayment, and Orange County’s failure to reaffirm its 
obligations unequivocally may have eroded the trust between 
municipal issuers and investors. See The Effect of the Orange 
County Crisis on Investors and Issuers, Commission Report on 
Government, 27 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP), News and Comment, No. 13 at 
A8 (Aug. 15, 1995) (quoting Congressional testimony of Daniel 
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Orange County’s bankruptcy filing were required to 
offer higher yields of fifteen to twenty-five 
basis points. Together with an additional twenty 
basis points for bond insurance, some of these 
California government issuers paid almost an 
additional half percentage point for their 
borrowings. For an expected $7 billion in 
aggregate seasonal note borrowings, the extra 
interest cost would run about $15 million 
annually.95 
The California legislature recognized the 
statewide implications of municipal default in 
enacting financial control provisions for Orange 
County in SB 1276: 
It is in the interest of the state and all public 
debt issuers within the state to enable the 
County of Orange to finance an acceptable plan of 
adjustment in order to improve the credit 
standing of California public debt issuers and to 
preserve and protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of the residents of the county and the 
state. To that end, successfully resolving the 
county bankruptcy and restoring the financial 
position of county government is a matter of 
statewide interest and concern.96 
Moreover, the effects of a significant 
municipal default may be felt nationwide. The 
Orange County bankruptcy filing caused a run on 
the Texas Investment Pool.97 It apparently also 
raised municipal borrowing costs in Maine, 
according to the state treasurer.98 
Financial markets harbor some implicit 
expectation that the state will stand behind a 
defaulting municipality’s bond obligations. This 
is understandable, given that state governments 
have always come to the aid of their distressed 
municipalities. 
While a local government may fall from fiscal 
grace, the perceived wisdom is that the state 
 
 
95. See John E. Petersen, A Guide to the Municipal Bond Market: 
The Post-Orange County Era, GOVERNING (Nov. 1995). 
96. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 30400 (1999). 
97. See JORION, supra note 33, at 74. 
98. See Municipal Markets Lobby for Change; The Trouble with 
Chapter 9, 28 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP), News and Comment, No. 22, at 
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will step in to clean up the mess. In almost all 
cases involving general units of government and 
tax-supported debt, that has been the case. New 
York City, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Bridgeport, 
even little Chelsea in Massachusetts, were thrown 
a lifeline by the state. Their respective states 
swam through the often shark-infested waters of 
politics to effect a rescue. Not since the 
default of Detroit in the 1930s had a state 
failed to intervene to head off a default or 
bankruptcy by a major local government.99 
In California especially, expectations of state 
intervention seem reasonable, as the state budget 
and   the budgets of  its counties  are all 
interrelated.  Beginning with Proposition 13 in 
1978, when taxing and spending restrictions were 
placed on state  and local governments, counties 
have  become highly dependent on the state to provide 
the necessary funding for local services.100 Because
  municipal bankruptcy  is not “free,” resort 
to Chapter 9 should not be done casually. 
Moreover, because of  the possible  statewide 
spillover effects, local  autonomy  concerns must 
give  way to  statewide  fiscal   concerns,  and 
objections to state involvement in the decision 
whether  to  resort  to  Chapter   9  should  be 
discounted.  Bankruptcy of a major municipality 
will almost  certainly raise borrowing  costs for 
other California municipalities and the state, and 
the bankruptcy process itself is expensive.  These 
potential spillover effects  suggest  that the 
decision to declare bankruptcy should not be left 
to the sole discretion of any municipality. In 
the  context of considering  reforms  to  federal 
bankruptcy  law, a working group   report  of the 
National Bankruptcy Review Commission asserted: 
It is simply “wrong” to allow a financially 
troubled municipality, whose problems reach and 
affect not only its own citizens and 
constituencies but affect others throughout the 
 
 
99. Petersen, supra note 95. See also BALDASSARE, supra note 1, 
at 86 (1998). “In every other major credit crisis in government 
in the last 25 years, states have taken a lead role. . . . 
There is an implied moral obligation of states to help their 
municipalities.” Id., quoting Sally Hofmeister, Bankruptcy 
Peculiar to California, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1995, at D1. 
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state, to unilaterally seek relief under the 
bankruptcy laws without prior authorization from 
the state within which it operates.101 
Given that the costs of default will be borne 
by the state as a whole, and given the connection 
between state allocations and local budgets, the 
state government should have the opportunity to 
consider whether bankruptcy is the best approach 
to the problem. While bankruptcy might be the 
best of a number of unattractive alternatives, and 
perhaps the costs of municipal default should be 
spread throughout the state under some 
circumstances, that decision is essentially a 
political one that implicates the entire state. A 
distressed municipality should not be authorized 
to decide the question unilaterally. For similar 
reasons, conditions imposed on a filing 
municipality should not be inhibited by home rule 
concerns when a fiscal crisis will have statewide 
impact. Trusteeship provisions were ultimately 
enacted in connection with the Orange County 
bankruptcy, and my proposal incorporates the 
possibility of similar mechanisms.102 
 
B. The Politics and Economics of State Involvement 
Resolution of a serious crisis will often 
require some kind of eventual state involvement. 
As an historical matter, state governments have 
always come to the aid of large cities in 
distress.103 Especially in California, where 
municipalities are restricted in their ability to 
raise taxes even in the face of financial crisis, 
the state may be the only possible source of the 
necessary financing.104 
However, in California, given the absence of a 




101. See Commission Report on Government, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 
(LRP), News and Comment, No. 8 (Aug. 13, 1996) (quoting National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission report of Working Group on 
Government as Creditor or Debtor). 
102. See infra Part IV[B][4]. 
103. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
104. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 26. Orange County voters 
overwhelmingly rejected a proposed half-cent sales tax increase 
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political and economic dynamics may impede timely 
joint action by state and local officials. Local 
officials may prefer not to involve state 
officials unless and until it is absolutely 
unavoidable, and state officials may be reluctant 
to get involved as well. These predilections are 
understandable. Local officials might fear that 
state involvement would hamper local action and 
cause negative publicity. And negative publicity 
might hurt the municipal entity’s restructuring 
efforts, as well as creating political 
embarrassment to the local officials. For their 
part, state officials may likewise be reluctant to 
get involved. Not only will they not have the 
intimate familiarity with local issues and local 
history that municipal officials have, but state 
officials may also fear getting tarred with the 
political fallout from the crisis if they 
intervene too early or too aggressively. 
In terms of a state authorization regime, the 
current system of blanket authorization to file 
bankruptcy may be a politically attractive 
arrangement. Local officials do not have to give 
up any control to state officers. Local officials 
will be certain that a bankruptcy “out” is 
available if necessary. State officials enjoy 
insulation from any negative fallout from the 
local crisis, and no immediate state budgetary 
issues are implicated. No special appropriation 
need be made to resolve the crisis.  State 
officials can simply wait and see. Moreover, the 
short-term financial costs imposed as a result of 
the municipal filing are largely invisible from a 
budgetary standpoint. Those costs come in the 
form of higher borrowing costs for other municipal 
issuers, a consequence for which no state official 
need be blamed. 
The political dynamics suggest that, absent 
some specific incentive to do otherwise, state and 
local officials may join forces too late, rather 
than too early. But in general, it may be 
preferable to err on the side of early state 
involvement. State participation assures that 
statewide interests are considered in the 
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addressing the crisis, and early involvement may 
serve to avoid some of the costs of distress. 
Moreover, bankruptcy need not necessarily 
precede a comprehensive plan of debt 
restructuring.105 It may be that state involvement 
could help avoid the need for a bankruptcy filing, 
thereby minimizing the fallout from a default. 
State involvement could pave the way for whatever 
state approvals—executive or legislative—may be 
required to implement a restructuring outside of 
bankruptcy. An emergency appropriation or state 
credit could help to contain a crisis, while 
setting certain terms and conditions for 
restructuring. For example, when New York City 
encountered fiscal problems in 1975, the state 
intervened. It created agencies to guaranty the 
city’s loans, while imposing fiscal controls on 
city government.106 New York and other states, 
anticipating municipal financial distress, have 
enacted comprehensive mechanisms for state 
intervention. These mechanisms generally 
incorporate the possibility of a bankruptcy 
filing, but do not depend on it.107 
Any plan for resolution of fiscal crisis will 
have to address the concerns of creditors, 
residents, and possibly employees. Whatever 
arrangement is reached among the municipality and 
these various constituencies will require state 
involvement. But no deal will be cut without some 
mechanism to hold everyone’s feet to the fire. 
Bankruptcy could be that mechanism—as it was in 
Orange County—but it might not have to be. 
Prebankruptcy state intervention should at least 
be considered. Bankruptcy may be politically 
palatable in the short run, but it is an expensive 
 
 
105. Indeed, Section 109(c) contemplates that a municipality may 
already have negotiated a plan satisfactory to the majority of 
its creditors by the time it files for bankruptcy.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 109(c)(5)(A) (1994). Chapter 9 would then simply be used to 
impose the plan over the objection of any minority dissenting 
creditors. 
106. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 11. This is not to suggest 
that the nature of New York City’s fiscal problems were similar 
to Orange County’s. However, in these cases and others, state 
involvement is almost always required. 
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mechanism in terms of both direct and indirect 
costs, and these costs are distributed haphazardly 
through the workings of the bond markets.108 
Moreover, a bankruptcy filing may be interpreted 
as the municipality’s repudiation of its full 
faith and credit commitment to its bondholders— 
its commitment to resort to its taxing powers if 
necessary to satisfy its debt.109 
A discretionary bankruptcy authorization 
mechanism requiring approval of state officials 
would encourage early interaction. Local 
officials, anticipating the possibility of 
financial distress, would wish to explore the 
bankruptcy option. But to do that, they would 
have to consult with the state officials 
responsible for authorizing the bankruptcy filing. 
That is, they would have to involve state 
officials in their bankruptcy planning. State 
officials, knowing they might have to decide 
whether to authorize a bankruptcy filing, would 
hopefully take an active role in addressing the 
problem upfront. Placing this responsibility on 
state officials encourages and requires them to 
focus on the crisis early and to consider its 
statewide implications. Such implications may be 
significant—as in  Orange  County—or 
insignificant. A hands-off approach at the state 
level may or may not be appropriate in given 
cases. But simple inertia should not be the 
reason for a lack of proactive state involvement. 
Throughout the Orange County crisis, the 
governor and other state officials had apparently 
been kept well informed by county officials. 
However, the state took no action—formal or 
informal—until after bankruptcy was filed in 
December 1994, even though signs of financial 
demise were readily apparent months before the 
filing. The Orange County treasurer’s race in the 
spring of 1994 called attention to the high risk 
of the OCIP portfolio.  John Moorlach, challenger 
 
 
108. After municipal bankruptcy and default, the next 
municipality interested in floating a bond issue will suffer 
higher interest rates in the market, or will simply do without 
the financing. 
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to the incumbent treasurer Robert Citron, warned 
in May 1994 that OCIP had already lost $1.2 
billion because of interest rate hikes by the 
Federal Reserve that had begun in February. His 
dire predictions were discounted to some extent as 
mere political attack on the incumbent. However, 
by mid-November, outside auditors retained by the 
county confirmed a $1.5 billion loss. When the 
county could not convince its investment bankers 
not to foreclose on their collateral for the 
county’s reverse repurchase agreements, the county 
filed for bankruptcy on December 6, 1994.110 
Even after the filing, the state made no 
official move to intervene. Instead, there was 
mutual finger pointing between state and county 
officials as to who should bear blame for their 
failure to work together to avoid the bankruptcy.111 
Unofficially, Governor Wilson convinced a former 
member of his administration, Tom Hayes, to step 
in to manage OCIP shortly after the bankruptcy 
filing.112 The governor’s ties to Orange County 
presumably helped to pave the way for Hayes’ 
appointment by the county Board of Supervisors. 
“The governor had accomplished a new kind of 
‘state intervention.’ The county government had 
retained the former state treasurer as the 
overseer of the failed investment fund.”113 
It was only after the county had declared 
bankruptcy and defaulted on bond obligations, 
county taxpayers rejected a proposed half-cent 
sales tax increase, and the county worked out 
settlement terms with investment pool 
participants, that the legislature acted in 
furtherance of a comprehensive resolution of the 
crisis.114 While it is unclear, given the politics 
of the situation and the complexity of the legal 
issues involved, whether a comprehensive 




110. See id. at 175. 
111. See id. at 121. 
112. Hayes had been state treasurer and state auditor-general 
under Wilson. See JORION, supra note 33, at 78. 
113. BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 122. 
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resort to bankruptcy,115 in other cases, bankruptcy 
and default may be avoidable—or their impact 
lessened—if the financial expertise and resources 
of the state are made available early on. 
 
C. Miscellaneous Issues 
 
(1) Moral Hazard 
In designing a framework to manage access to 
municipal bankruptcy, we should consider not only 
the question of how best to handle an imminent 
financial crisis. We should also consider how 
best to avoid crises and to address their impact 
at the earliest possible point. Some crises are 
of course unavoidable. However, to the extent 
that bankruptcy is or is perceived to  be  a 
“safety valve” for municipal entities, the safety 
valve should not be made too easily available. 
Requiring approval of state officials means 
that municipal access to bankruptcy protection is 
never certain. Moreover, the prospect of state 
involvement may mean a curtailing of local 
autonomy, with possible political costs to local 
officials. Therefore, at the margin, municipal 
officials have some incentive to steer a more 
conservative fiscal course than they might if 
bankruptcy were always a ready alternative.116 
Assuming that local officials do not relish 
involvement of state officials in local affairs, a 
state approval requirement and the prospect of 
further state involvement provide additional 
incentive to avoid financial distress. 
 
(2) Confidentiality 
Confidentiality may also matter in the early 
stages of a financial crisis. A municipality will 




115. Experts and observers disagree as to whether a bankruptcy 
filing was necessary. See 28 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP), News and 
Comment, No. 9, at A1 (February 6, 1996). 
116. This is not to say that municipal officials do not already 
have significant political and other constraints that demand 
their fiscal vigilance. However, uncertainty as to bankruptcy 
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and one whose bonds are publicly traded will wish 
to avoid roiling the markets. Introducing state 
officials into the mix may create some 
confidentiality risks. Any  bankruptcy 
authorization mechanism should be structured to 
avoid or at least minimize this risk. 
 
(3) Smaller or Specialized Entities 
Problems of statewide financial impact will be 
greatest, of course, with the large 
municipalities—large cities and  counties. 
Financial distress for smaller municipal entities 
may not raise these same concerns. However, for 
these smaller entities, resort to Chapter 9 may be 
ill advised for other reasons. Certain types of 
municipal entities may not be ideal candidates for 
bankruptcy, not because of any widespread impact 
of their financial demise or any effect on 
financial markets. Instead, for some 
municipalities, the complexity and expense of 
municipal bankruptcy may make it a poor device for 
handling financial crisis. In the Orange County 
case, for example, fees for the county’s 
bankruptcy attorneys and other professionals 
totaled about $50 million by the end of the case. 
This figure does not include the costs of the 
county’s postbankruptcy lawsuits or professional 
fees for OCIP participants.117 For a small pest 
control district or sewage district, resort to 
bankruptcy may generate more costs than it saves. 
For smaller entities, the bankruptcy process may 
not be cost-justified. 
Distinguishing among the multifarious municipal 
entities that exist in California in terms of 
their suitability for Chapter 9 is another reason 
for limiting access at state officials’ 
discretion. 
Crafting a workable system of state involvement 
is hardly a simple affair. Political deadlock 
might possibly thwart a timely response to fiscal 
crisis. However, if managed properly, as described 
below, state involvement need not hinder or delay 
financial   restructuring,   and   may   in   fact 
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facilitate it. Operational issues  like 
timeliness, predictability, flexibility, and 
interests in minimizing threshold litigation are 
discussed below in the context of my basic 
framework for discretionary access. 
 
IV. Structuring the Appropriate System 
In this Part, I describe my proposal, which 
places with the governor the discretion to 
authorize municipal bankruptcy filings. As 
prologue, I survey the range of plausible 
approaches to structuring a state authorization 
mechanism, discussing the general advantages and 
drawbacks to each basic approach. I then outline 
my proposal and explain how it attempts to resolve 
the various tensions. 
 
A. Municipal Bankruptcy Authorization: the Range of 
Approaches 
In this section, I consider  plausible 
approaches to structuring a state authorization 
mechanism for municipal bankruptcy. Other states’ 
approaches, as well as the bills introduced in the 
California legislature in the aftermath of the 
Orange County bankruptcy, give some flavor of the 
range of available alternatives. Approaches range 
from blanket, unqualified authorization for all of 
a state’s municipal entities to express 
prohibition across the board. In the middle are 
proposals requiring straightforward prior approval 
or some exercise of discretion by state officials. 
Some states have also devised elaborate 
nonbankruptcy approaches to municipal financial 
distress, sometimes including bankruptcy as an 
option.118 These approaches may lead to outright 






118. See DEP’T OF PUB. ADMIN., COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS IN 
PENNSYLVANIA’S LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A PROGRAM EVALUATION OF ACT 47 app. 4 
(PA State Univ. Graduate Sch. of Pub. Pol’y & Admin. 1991) 
[hereinafter COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS] (summarizing municipal 
distress statutes of Florida, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, 
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(1) Blanket Authorization 
A dozen or so states authorize  unfettered 
access to municipal bankruptcy for some or all of 
their municipal entities.119 Blanket authorization 
for all municipal entities otherwise  eligible 
under federal law has the virtues of simplicity 
and definiteness. This approach provides the 
municipality with maximum flexibility in dealing 
with its financial distress and negotiating with 
creditors. It reduces the likelihood of 
bankruptcy court litigation over the scope of 
state law authorization.120 It would appear to 
enable a timely filing, once the municipality has 
decided to enter bankruptcy. 
However, these apparent advantages and their 
apparent popularity with some states should not be 
overstated. Even assuming clear state 
authorization, litigation may arise with respect 
to the other federal gate keeping requirements of 
Section 109(c)—for example, whether the entity 
qualifies as a municipality or whether it is 
insolvent.121 Therefore, some amount of uncertainty 
will always exist as to a municipality’s ready 
access to Chapter 9. 
Even assuming that a blanket authorization 
provision could provide definiteness and 
flexibility to a municipality in distress, it has 
one fundamental shortcoming insofar as it ignores 
the possible statewide financial impact of a 
municipal filing. By providing blanket access to 
Chapter 9 without some explicit mechanism for 
state  intervention,  the  state  foregoes  its 
 
 
119. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. California’s 
existing authorization statute, Section 53760 of the Government 
Code, would appear to offer broad authorization as well. Though 
outdated with respect to its references to federal bankruptcy 
law, the statute essentially authorizes to any  California 
“taxing agency or instrumentality” to file bankruptcy. See 
supra note 27 and accompanying text. However, the Orange County 
court found that the statute was not broad enough to cover OCIP. 
See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
120. Recall the litigation that occurred under the predecessor 
provision to current § 109(c)(2), which required only general 
state authorization for a municipality to file bankruptcy. See 
supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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opportunity and responsibility to act to minimize 
the possible statewide costs of financial 
distress, which will be borne indirectly by other 
municipalities and the state as a whole.122 
Like California, some states enacted blanket 
authorization provisions decades ago and never 
revised them. Washington State, for instance, 
authorizes “any taxing district” to “file the 
petition mentioned in section 80 of chapter IX of 
the federal bankruptcy act.”123 This is the same 
obsolete reference found in California’s 
authorizing provision. The Washington statute was 
enacted in 1935.124 Given that the vast majority of 
municipal filings have historically involved small 
special purpose entities—irrigation districts, 
school districts, and the like—and that the 
bankruptcy of a city or county is extremely rare, 
it is not surprising that states enacting 
authorization provisions fifty or sixty years ago 
would have failed to consider possible statewide 





122. See supra Part II[A]. 
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.64.040 (1999). 
124. See id. 
125. Moreover, what initially appear to be “blanket” 
authorization provisions sometimes turn out to be more limited in 
scope. For example, Florida’s authorization statute would appear 
to provide blanket authorization for all its municipal entities. 
It states: 
For the purpose of rendering effective the privilege and 
benefits of any amendments to the bankruptcy laws of the 
United States that may be enacted for the relief of 
municipalities, taxing districts and political 
subdivisions, the state represented by its legislative 
body gives its assent to, and accepts the provisions of 
any such bankruptcy laws that may be enacted by the 
Congress of the United States for the benefit and relief 
of municipalities, taxing districts and political 
subdivisions and its several municipalities, taxing 
districts and political subdivisions, at the discretion of 
the governing authorities thereof, may institute and 
conduct and carry out, by any appropriate bankruptcy 
procedure that may be enacted into the laws of the United 
States for the purpose of conferring upon municipalities, 
taxing districts and political subdivisions, relief by 
proceedings in bankruptcy in the federal courts. 
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(2) Blanket Prohibition 
Like blanket authorization, blanket prohibition 
of all municipal entities from filing bankruptcy 
has the advantages of simplicity and definiteness. 
There will be no litigation over municipal access 
to Chapter 9. However, this approach obviously 
makes unavailable what might be a useful tool for 
financial crisis management. It is quite a blunt 
approach, effectively predetermining that a 
Chapter 9 filing will never be appropriate for any 
municipal entity in the state. 
At the least, the state would have to provide 
some other mechanism for addressing municipal 
financial crisis. But state law approaches may 
have shortcomings because of federal 
Constitutional limitations on impairment of 
contracts.126 Blanket prohibition is probably too 
blunt and is not recommended. Only Georgia 
expressly prohibits all resort to Chapter 9.127 
 
(3) Limited Nondiscretionary Access 
A middle path between blanket authorization and 
blanket prohibition would be to create categories 
of municipal entities that would have varying 
standards for bankruptcy  authorization.  Some 
might be granted unconditional authority to file; 
others would have conditional authority for 
bankruptcy; and still others would be prohibited. 
Given the multifarious types of municipal entities 
that exist in California, it might be possible to 
distinguish particular types of entities that 
should or should not have access to bankruptcy. 
 
 
for active intervention by the governor in case of financial 
emergency, which is triggered upon the occurrence of any of 
several specific financial or other defaults. During the period 
of financial emergency, the municipal entity may not seek 
bankruptcy protection without the governor’s approval. See id. § 
218.503(4). The governor also has significant oversight 
authority over the local entity and may appoint a financial 
oversight board. See id. § 218.503(3). It is unlikely that a 
municipality would be a candidate for bankruptcy without already 
having triggered a financial emergency. Therefore, as  a 
practical matter, the blanket authorization provision may never 
matter. 
126. See supra Part I[A]. 
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General purpose political subdivisions—cities and 
counties—are distinguishable from special purpose 
entities—irrigation, hospital, and pest control 
districts. The statewide political and economic 
ramifications of financial distress would 
generally be more drastic with the former than the 
latter. The latter are more likely to be smaller, 
with smaller budgets and fewer constituents that 
might be affected by an entity’s financial 
distress. 
This “pre-defined access” approach has merit 
insofar as it offers the prospect of separate, 
somewhat tailored solutions for different types of 
municipalities. This might provide some 
definiteness and predictability for particular 
municipal entities, financial markets, and 
creditors, as compared to a wholly discretionary 
system. By drawing lines ahead of time, this 
approach might avoid the politicization and 
confusion that could occur in attempting to 
exercise discretionary authority in the charged 
context of a particular crisis. 
On the other hand, this approach may suffer the 
risk of rapid obsolescence. Times change faster 
than statutes do, as the current authorization 
provision illustrates. New types of municipal 
entities may arise. Witness the Orange County 
Investment Pool. New types of financing are 
possible. It may be too much to hope that a 
statute of this type would maintain its relevance 
without constant revision, a fairly unattractive 
prospect. 
Moreover, even adopting a line drawing 
approach, it is not altogether clear where to draw 
the lines or even what the appropriate  line 
drawing criteria should be. Even distinguishing 
general purpose entities from special purpose 
districts as proposed above does not give us clear 
direction as to which  group—if  either—should 
have more ready access to Chapter 9. As discussed 
earlier, limiting access for cities and counties 
is justified because of the statewide implications 
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officials in structuring a comprehensive fix.128 By 
contrast, limiting access for smaller special 
purpose entities makes sense because bankruptcy 
might not be a cost effective way to resolve their 
fiscal woes. A pest control district,  for 
example, might not possess the financial, legal, 
or other expertise necessary to use bankruptcy 
effectively, or even to decide whether bankruptcy 
would be useful.129 In addition, municipalities of 
the same type may have vastly different fiscal 
problems. One county, for example, may suffer 
from a progressively shrinking tax base and a 
daunting payroll burden, while another risks 
financial default because of poor investment 
decisions. In either case, whether and when to 
allow resort to bankruptcy is difficult to decide 
in the abstract. 
In my research, I did not come across any state 
with a coherent or comprehensive system for 
categorizing municipal entities for purposes of 
bankruptcy access. Some states have particular 
authorizing statutes for particular types of 
entities, but these appear to have been enacted on 
an ad hoc basis for the specific types of 
municipal entities addressed, and not in any 
comprehensive way. For example, Colorado has 
separate authorizing provisions for irrigation and 
drainage districts130 and special districts,131  but 
no statute of general application.132 As a result, 
authorization statutes for particular entities may 





128. See supra Part III[A]. 
129. See supra Part III[C]. 
130. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-32-102 (1999). 
131. See id. § 32-1-1403. 
132. The reason for this lack of a general statute in Colorado 
and other states may be that before 1994, federal bankruptcy law 
did not require specific state authorization but only general 
authorization. Many courts were willing to infer general 
authorization quite readily. See cases cited supra notes 24-25. 
States may therefore have assumed that for general purpose 
municipalities, explicit statutory authorization was unnecessary, 
and they have not gotten around to amending their statutes 
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B. A Proposal for Discretionary Access 
The basic premise of my proposal is that the 
governor must authorize any municipal bankruptcy 
filing. The governor should also have  wide 
latitude to attach conditions to the bankruptcy 
authorization. In terms of setting conditions, 
the governor should have a short menu of well- 
defined options at his disposal, including the 
possible appointment of a trustee to manage the 
municipal entity through its financial crisis. 
My approach attempts to encourage  and 
facilitate cooperation between the state and the 
distressed municipality. Rather than empowering 
the governor to dictate terms to a municipality in 
trouble, it will encourage early communication 
between the two and a negotiated resolution of any 
financial crisis. This section describes the 
structure and scope of the discretionary system. 
The next section explains the anticipated 
negotiation dynamics. 
 
(1) Other State Models 
Several states have similar discretionary 
systems. Connecticut requires the governor’s 
consent.133 In addition, if he consents, the 
governor must report to the State Treasurer and 
the General Assembly to explain the basis for this 
decision.134   North Carolina requires preapproval by 
a Local Government Commission,135 a nine-member 
commission that forms a division within the state 
treasurer’s department. The Commission comprises 
the state treasurer, the state auditor, the 




133. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-566 (1999). 
134. See id. This provision was enacted in the wake of the 
controversy over the city of Bridgeport’s attempt to file 
bankruptcy over the objection of the state of Connecticut, which 
claimed that Bridgeport was not authorized to file under state 
law. See In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688 (Bankr. W.D. 
Conn. 1991). That case arose under former Section 109(c) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which required only general state authorization 
to file.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
135. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-48 (1999). This provision, enacted 
in 1939, is a bit outdated. It refers to creditor approval 












In New Jersey, a Municipal Finance Commission 
must approve both the filing of the petition137 and 
any plan of adjustment.138 These provisions are 
part of a general state intervention scheme.  Once 
a municipality has been in financial default to 
bondholders or noteholders for more than sixty 
days, the Commission may intervene to manage the 
financial affairs of the municipality.139 Other 
states have similar comprehensive schemes for 
assertion of state control over municipalities in 
distress. Typically the body designated by the 
state to oversee or manage the municipality also 
has power to authorize or even initiate a 
bankruptcy filing.140 
Pennsylvania has two separate systems for 
cities in distress—one for its largest cities141 
and one for smaller cities and towns.142 The 
Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation 
Authority is a state agency charged with providing 
technical and financial assistance to large cities 
in distress.143 Among other things, the Authority 
may issue bonds and extend loans to the “assisted 
city.” While this system is quite elaborate, 




136. See id. § 159-3. 
137. See N.J. STAT. § 52:27-40 (1999). 
138. See id. § 52:27-42. 
139. See id. § 52:27-2. The Commission is in the Division of 
Local Government within the Department of the Treasury.  See id. 
§ 52:18A-20. 
140. See Freyberg, supra note 6, at 1011. 
141. The Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperative Authority 
Act (“Act 6”) was passed in 1991. See 53 PA. STAT. §§ 
12720.101-.709 (1999). It applies only for “cities of the first 
class,” which are those with populations exceeding one million. 
See id. § 101. At the time of enactment of Act 6, Philadelphia 
was the only first class city in the state. See Comment, Drew 
Patrick Gannon, An Analysis of Pennsylvania’s Legislative 
Programs for Financially Distressed Municipalities and the 
Reaction of Municipal Labor Unions, 98 DICK. L. REV. 281, 292 
(1994). 
142. The Municipal Financial Recovery Act (“Act 47”)  was 
enacted in 1987. See id. §§ 11701.101-.501. It was designed 
specifically to address the fiscal crises of dying steel towns in 
western Pennsylvania.  See Gannon, supra note 141. 
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the Authority nor the assisted city may file for 
bankruptcy as long as the Authority has bonds 
outstanding.144 Second, the governor must approve 
any bankruptcy petition and the plan of 
adjustment, which must be submitted for the 
governor’s approval along with the petition.145 For 
certain other municipal entities, the Department 
of Internal Affairs must authorize the bankruptcy 
filing and approve the plan of adjustment.146 
 
(2) Why the Governor? 
Given the need for early state involvement in 
municipal financial distress situations, the 
governor’s office is probably the best place to 
begin that cooperative process. The governor is 
the chief executive of the state, and his office 
may be best situated to bring expertise and 
resources to bear on the problem and to initiate 
any legislative or executive action that may be 
necessary. Placing responsibility for the 
decision with the governor’s office  also 
eliminates any ambiguity concerning who at the 
state level is “responsible” for authorizing the 
bankruptcy filing. This has both political and 
practical administrative benefits. 
Having only one state official making the 
authorization decision assures that that official 
bears the entire responsibility—that is, receives 
all the credit or blame—for a good or  bad 
decision or strategy.147 That political clarity 




144. See id. § 12720.211(A). 
145. See id. § 12720.211(B), (C). 
146. See id. § 5571. Pennsylvania’s model of state intervention 
may be particularly instructive insofar as it has actually gotten 
some use. In 1992, the city of Scranton, the fifth largest in 
the state, became the tenth municipality to seek refuge under 
Pennsylvania’s Financially Distressed Municipalities Act of 1987. 
See Michael deCourcy Hinds, A Campaign to Pull Scranton Back from 
Disaster, N. Y. TIMES, July 21, 1992, at A12. 
147. My preference for the governor is not a strong one. I am 
more concerned that one senior state official be responsible for 
exercising the discretionary power to authorize municipal 
filings. The state treasurer might be an equally appropriate 
state officer. For the following discussion, however, I will 
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governor’s office to the crisis. Any inclination 
to head for the sidelines, to try to sidestep the 
likely political fallout from the crisis, would be 
untenable. As the sole gatekeeper regarding any 
possible bankruptcy strategy, the governor and his 
office would have no choice but to become 
involved. This clear delineation of authority 
also assures that if necessary, prompt action is 
possible. In case exigent circumstances require 
an immediate decision concerning a bankruptcy 
filing, the governor can provide the necessary 
authorization. By contrast, a committee structure 
or legislative approach might include more 
procedural baggage, which always creates the 
possibility of gridlock or other delay. 
In my view, affirmative authorization should 
always be required. That is, the authorization 
statute should not permit or create the potential 
for authorization by default as a result of the 
governor’s failure to act on  an  application. 
Among other things, SB 349 provided that any 
request for authorization would be considered 
approved after five days unless the LABC responded 
otherwise. However, that kind of “pocket 
approval” is exactly the sort of mechanism that 
attenuates political accountability and 
facilitates inaction at the state level. It 
leaves the municipality to its own devices without 
any active involvement by state officials.148 
The point of not allowing for passive 
authorization is to improve political 
accountability by assuring that state officials 
must do something, as opposed to doing nothing, in 
the face of a municipal crisis. Eliminating the 
possibility of passive state authorization forces 
the governor to act, either by explicitly 
acquiescing to the request for authorization or 
coming  up  with  an  alternative.     It  also 
 
 
148. In addition, there is always the issue of what should be 
the appropriate amount of time within which the authorizing body 
or person must respond before a decision is made by default. Too 
long a period might hamper timely action by the distressed 
municipality. Too short a period might force  uninformed 
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underscores the point that a municipal filing is 
more than simply a local matter, and as such 
demands the attention and action of the governor 
and other state officials. 
Local officials might balk at the possibility 
that the governor’s inaction might delay a 
bankruptcy filing indefinitely. However, this 
theoretical possibility should not create a basis 
for objection. Given the statewide financial 
impact of a bankruptcy filing, no municipal entity 
has any “right” to file based on any notion of 
home rule or local autonomy. Once a local crisis 
threatens to impose costs on other entities 
throughout the state, the crisis is no longer 
simply a matter of local concern. Moreover, as 
earlier discussed, ready access to Chapter 9 
creates moral hazard problems, and uncertain 
access may have some disciplining effect on local 
officials.149 To the extent that timely action by 
the governor may matter, it will be up to local 
officials to coordinate with the governor’s 
office, making sure that the governor is up to 
speed on the issues, so that he may make timely 
decisions as necessary. A municipal filing should 
always require some affirmative authorization from 
the state. 
 
(3) Guidelines Concerning Discretion 
It may be advisable in the authorizing statute 
to include guidelines for the governor’s exercise 
of discretion. The authorizing statute might 
describe factors for the governor to consider or 
particular agencies to consult, depending on the 
type of municipal entity. For example, the 
superintendent of schools would be a useful 
adviser to the governor concerning the possible 
bankruptcy filing for a school district. Perhaps 
the superintendent’s concurrence in the governor’s 
 
grant of bankruptcy authorization should be 
required a s well.150 This sort of “authority- 
149. See supra Part III[C][1]. 
150. Under current law, the state-appointed administrator for a 
distressed school district must approve the school district’s 
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sharing” arrangement would depend on  the 
particular type of municipality at issue, but in 
any event should at a minimum require the 
governor’s affirmative authorization. 
Pennsylvania’s authorizing statute for large 
cities provides an example. It describes the 
process by which the governor must exercise 
discretion with respect to a city contemplating a 
municipal filing, including particular agencies 
with which the governor must consult: 
(1) When any such petition shall be submitted 
to the Governor for approval, accompanied with a 
proposed plan of readjustment of the debts of a 
city, the Governor shall make a careful and 
thorough investigation of the financial condition 
of such city, of its assets and liabilities, of 
its sinking fund, and whether the affairs thereof 
are managed in a careful, prudent and economic 
manner in order to ascertain whether the 
presentation of such petition is justified, or 
represents an unjust attempt by such city to 
evade payment of some of its contractual 
obligations, and, if the Governor believes that 
such petition should be approved, whether the 
plan of readjustment submitted will be helpful to 
the financial condition of the city and is 
feasible and, at the same time, fair and 
equitable to all creditors. 
(2) The Governor shall also, prior to giving his 
approval, ascertain the amount, if any, of the 
obligations of any such petitioning city which is 
held by any agency or agencies of the State 
government as trust funds and shall, before 
approving any such petition and plan of 
readjustment, consult with and give every such 
agency an opportunity to be heard and the 
privilege to examine the findings of the Governor 
resulting from the investigation hereinbefore 
required to be made, and shall likewise hear any 
other creditor of such city, whether resident in 
or outside of this Commonwealth, who shall apply 
therefor. 
(3) The Governor, if he approves a petition, 
shall, before giving his approval, require such 
 
 
In re Richmond Unified School Dist., 133 B.R. 221 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 1991) (granting Chapter 9 debtor’s motion to dismiss case 
after state school superintendent appointed administrator to 
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modification in the proposed plan for readjusting 
the debts as to him appear proper.151 
Providing guidelines would be politically 
useful as well, making clear that the governor’s 
discretion is not unfettered. On the other hand, 
guidelines that are too elaborate might hobble the 
system, either requiring excessive investigation 
by the governor before making a decision or 
creating the possibility of litigation over the 
governor’s compliance with the guidelines. The 
right balance will be important. 
 
(4) Conditions to Filing: Financial and Operational 
Oversight 
As the state officer empowered to authorize a 
municipal bankruptcy filing, the governor should 
also be given the power to attach conditions to 
any authorization.152 Certain conditions may be 
appropriate in order to facilitate a prompt 
resolution of the crisis and to mitigate the 
statewide impact of a filing. Several states have 
enacted fairly elaborate nonbankruptcy approaches 
to municipal distress, with varying degrees of 
oversight and control over municipal affairs 
during the pendency of the crisis. For our 
purposes, similar provisions could be included as 
“off-the-rack” options for the governor to attach 
as conditions to an authorization for a bankruptcy 
filing. Conditions could range from the 
governor’s prebankruptcy approval of a proposed 
plan of adjustment to the governor’s appointment 
of a trustee to manage the municipality’s affairs 
during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. 
In Michigan, if evidence exists of a “serious 
financial problem” with a local government, the 
governor may appoint a “review team” to make an 




151. 53 PA. STAT. § 12720.211(C) (1999). 
152. For a thorough discussion of the legal basis for the 
state’s imposition of conditions to authorization, see AMY CHANG, 
MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: STATE AUTHORIZATION UNDER THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY CODE 
(Pub. Law Research Inst., Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of the 
Law, Working Paper Series (Fall 1995)), available at 
www.uchastings.edu/plri/fal95tex/muniban.html. 
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only to investigate the local government entity, 
but also, if necessary, to negotiate a consent 
agreement with the local government concerning 
long-range plans for financial recovery.154 If a 
consent agreement is not obtained or the local 
government subsequently fails to comply, then the 
governor may declare a financial emergency and 
basically effect a takeover of the local 
government by an emergency financial manager.155 
The emergency financial manager has authority to 
place the local government in bankruptcy if 
attempts to adopt and implement a feasible 
financial plan fail.156 
While these nonbankruptcy municipal crisis 
management structures may be a bit more elaborate 
than California may need or want, they provide 
useful models of state management from which to 
borrow. Resort to these devices could be done 
contemporaneously with an authorization to file 
bankruptcy. Without limiting the governor’s 
discretion to tailor conditions to particular 
circumstances, I propose three basic “off-the- 
rack” conditions—and  one  variation—that  might 
be useful. 
 
(a) Option 1 
The most aggressive condition that the governor 
could attach to a bankruptcy authorization would 




154. The agreement may provide for remedial measures considered 
necessary including a long-range financial recovery plan 
requiring specific local actions. The agreement may utilize state 
financial management and technical assistance as necessary in 
order to alleviate the local financial problem. The agreement may 
also provide for periodic fiscal status reports to the state 
treasurer. In order for the consent agreement to go into effect, 
it shall be approved, by resolution, by the governing body of the 
local government 
Id. § 141.1214. 
155. The governor shall “assign the responsibility for managing 
the local government financial emergency to the local emergency 
financial assistance loan board,” which appoints an emergency 
financial manager.  Id. § 141.1218(1). 
156. This decision to file bankruptcy is subject to veto by the 










50 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53 
 
 
municipality’s affairs, including  plan 
formulation, for the duration of the case. This 
condition should probably be reserved only for 
serious cases of financial mismanagement.157 
The option to appoint a trustee should also be 
available to the governor for the duration of any 
ongoing bankruptcy case, in case the debtor fails 
to comply with other, earlier conditions to 
authorization as described below. Because no 
well-defined mechanism exists to revoke a 
municipal debtor’s previously granted state 
authorization, the state may need to resort to 
appointment of a trustee in order to enforce its 
conditions or to dismiss a bankruptcy proceeding 
that the state deems is no longer advisable. 
 
(b) Option 1A 
A less intrusive precondition to bankruptcy 
authorization would be appointment of a trustee 
with the sole responsibility of formulating the 
plan. Municipal operations would continue to be 
managed by local officials, while the trustee 
focused on creditor negotiations. Failure of 
local officials to cooperate with the trustee with 
respect to plan formulation might result in 
expanded powers for the trustee.158 
 
(c) Option 2 




157. Because of the intrusiveness of this condition, perhaps its 
use should require the governor to obtain the concurrence of the 
state treasurer or another state official. However, the benefits 
of including restraints on the governor’s discretion should be 
carefully weighed against the possible costs of deadlock. 
Imagine, for example, that the governor refuses to authorize 
bankruptcy without appointment of a trustee, but the state 
treasurer refuses to concur in that precondition. The governor, 
the state treasurer, and municipal officials would then be locked 
in a sort of triangular negotiation, with possibilities for 
political opportunism all around. 
158. Pennsylvania’s approach for general municipal  distress 
takes a similar approach. Upon the filing of a petition, a plan 
coordinator is appointed to formulate the plan.  See 53 PA. STAT. 
§ 11701.262(C) (1999). The municipal debtor’s failure to 
cooperate with the coordinator can result in suspension of state 
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but would allow the governor to monitor the case 
quite closely. It would require that a plan of 
adjustment be submitted for the governor’s 
approval along with the request for bankruptcy 
authorization. Authorization could then be 
conditioned on the filing of the governor-approved 
plan either contemporaneously with the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition or before some specified 
deadline date. The governor could (a) reserve the 
right to approve any modification to the plan, and 
(b) set a deadline for plan confirmation as well. 
A post-filing violation of these conditions could 
trigger the governor’s appointment of a trustee, 
either to take control of the plan formulation 
process or to manage the municipal debtor in 
general. 
 
(d) Option 3 
The least intrusive approach would be for the 
governor to authorize the filing, and set 
deadlines for the filing and confirmation of a 
plan of adjustment. Failure to meet  either 
deadline could result in appointment of a trustee. 
There is legislative precedent in California 
for these approaches, and in particular for 
reliance on the trustee mechanism. With a series 
of bills, the legislature approved the diversion 
of infrastructure funds to the Orange County 
general fund to enable the county to fund a 
bankruptcy plan.159 With SB 1276, the legislature 
added a “back-up mechanism” to “guarantee that 
the county will be able to prepare and obtain 
confirmation of an acceptable plan of 
adjustment.”160 This back-up mechanism was the 
possible appointment of a state trustee at the 
discretion of the governor if the county had not 
filed a plan by January 1, 1996.161 Further, if the 
governor determined that timely confirmation of a 




159. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 167-68 (describing series of 
bills—AB 1664, SB 863, SB 1276 and SB 727—that effected funding 
of Orange County plan). 
160. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 30400(b). 
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appointment of a trustee was required.162 The 
trustee, if appointed, was broadly authorized to 
act for the county, exercising all powers of the 
board of supervisors.163 
 
C. Negotiated Resolution 
The structure described above anticipates that 
state and local officials will discuss possible 
conditions to bankruptcy authorization prior to 
any formal authorization request. For example, 
the governor might wish to appoint a trustee, but 
the municipality might oppose. As I envision the 
structure, the governor could not impose a trustee 
simply based on a municipality’s application for 
authorization, but may require it as a condition 
to filing. The municipality would be free to 
reject the governor’s bankruptcy authorization and 
attached conditions by deciding not to file for 
bankruptcy, and the conditions to authorization 
would never go into effect. 
This approach gives the municipality some 
measure of local sovereignty and yet encourages it 
to explore the bankruptcy option with the 
governor. While this may ultimately result in a 
standoff between the governor and the 
municipality, hopefully they would be able to 
reach a negotiated arrangement.164 This model of 
negotiated management of financial crisis follows 
other states’ nonbankruptcy mechanisms for 
resolution of municipal distress. As previously 
described, Michigan’s “review team” appointed by 
the governor is empowered to negotiate a consent 




162. See id. 
163. See id. § 30402. Because of the unusual circumstance that 
many creditors were also municipal entities, the trustee was also 
authorized to act on behalf of these cities, public districts, 
and other governmental agencies with claims against the county, 
to the extent necessary to prevent denial of confirmation of a 
plan of adjustment.  See id. § 30405. 
164. Possible legislative action would always be available to 
resolve a deadlock, either by authorizing the governor to appoint 
a trustee regardless of any bankruptcy filing, or by granting 
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concerning a recovery plan.165 Pennsylvania’s 
Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority is 
authorized to negotiate “intergovernmental 
cooperation agreements” with cities in need of 
assistance, and general assistance may not be 
provided unless such an agreement is in effect.166 
In contrast to these elaborate nonbankruptcy 
schemes, my proposal is less formal, less 
elaborate, and less aggressive than these other 
state systems. Because it is based on bankruptcy 
authorization, the system I propose is formally 
triggered only by a municipal entity’s application 
for bankruptcy authorization and its subsequent 
bankruptcy filing. By contrast, some states’ 
municipal distress systems include objective 
triggers of financial distress that enable early 
unilateral state intervention. I believe a more 
informal approach is appropriate for California. 
States that have elaborate state intervention 
provisions, like Michigan and Pennsylvania, 
typically anticipated multiple municipal crises as 
a result of general economic downturns and 
declining tax bases in their respective regions. 
Without prompt and active intervention by the 
state, successive municipal crises could have had 
severe statewide ramifications.167  In California, 
by contrast, municipal financial distress is quite 
rare, especially for general purpose 
municipalities. 
 
D. The Politics of Legislating Discretionary Access 
This distinction between California’s situation 
and those of states like Michigan and Pennsylvania 
suggests a final issue worth mentioning: the 
politics of legislating a discretionary access 
approach. Consistent with earlier discussion on 
the politics of state involvement in municipal 
 
 
165. See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text. 
166. See 53 PA. STAT. § 12720.203(D) (1999). 
167. See generally COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS, supra note 118 
(focusing on six distressed Pennsylvania municipalities—three 
cities and three boroughs—that became financially distressed in 
the three years following implementation of the Financially 
Distressed Municipalities Act (Act 47 of 1987), and commenting on 
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distress,168 the crafting of a more active role for 
the state in the affairs of financially distressed 
municipalities may face opposition from municipal 
entities and indifference from state officials. 
Even for a financially healthy municipality, its 
local officials may find unappealing the 
possibility of an increased role for the state in 
the case of its hypothetical financial distress. 
State officials as well may be unenthusiastic 
about the prospect of early involvement in 
managing local distress situations. 
However, each municipality, while concerned for 
its own autonomy, must also consider the 
consequences of autonomy for other municipalities 
in the state. Because a healthy municipality may 
be adversely affected by another municipal 
entity’s financial mismanagement or misfortunes, 
municipalities might favor legislating some system 
of active state involvement in municipal distress. 
Especially in states facing statewide economic 
crisis, healthy local entities may support state 
intervention in the affairs of distressed 
entities. A healthy entity has much to lose in 
that context without state intervention to stem 
the crisis. State officials likewise may have no 
choice in that situation but to assert an active 
role. Moreover, the specter of once-pending 
statewide financial crisis may go a long way 
toward explaining the existence of provisions for 
aggressive state intervention in other states. 
California currently faces no such crisis. 
Legislating a more active role for the state—even 
the relatively minor amendment of requiring the 
governor’s authorization for a Chapter 9 filing— 
may therefore fail to attract instant political 
support. Ironically, however, the absence of any 
imminent financial emergency may offer an ideal 
environment for careful consideration of such 
legislation. Deliberation removed from the 
passions of an immediate crisis may produce a 
better system of state authorization—one that 
better accounts for statewide interests—than 
case-specific  legislation  forged  under  time 
 
 








April 2002] AFTER ORANGE COUNTY 55 
 
 
pressure in the face of catastrophe. 
 
V. Some Issues Concerning the Scope and 
Definition of “Municipality” 
As earlier discussed, only a municipality—a 
“political subdivision or public agency or 
instrumentality of a State”169—is eligible for 
Chapter 9. In the course of discussion over 
California’s state authorization scheme, 
particular questions have been raised concerning 
the scope and clarity of this federal definition, 
and whether a state authorization scheme may 
account for such issues. In this part, I consider 
these questions. 
 
A. A State Law Definition of “Municipality” 
Noting possible ambiguity in the  U.S. 
bankruptcy law definition, some have suggested 
that a state authorization statute for Chapter 9 
should include a state law definition of 
“municipality” or an enumeration of entities that 
qualify.170 This comes in the wake of the 
controversial bankruptcy court decision in Orange 
County finding that OCIP was not a municipality 
under the federal statute and therefore not 
eligible for Chapter 9.171  A state law definition 
or list of public entities might be useful in 
indicating to a bankruptcy court what California 
considers a “public agency or instrumentality” of 
the state. In particular, a state law provision 
might at the margin encourage a bankruptcy court 
to construe Chapter 9 access more liberally than 
it otherwise would.172 
This approach has some promise but also some 




169. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (1994). 
170. See Memorandum from Henry C. Kevane, partner, Pachulski 
Stang Ziehl Young & Jones, to Randall Henry, Office of Senator 
Quentin L. Kopp at 3 (May 31, 1996) (on file with the California 
Law Revision Commission). 
171. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
172. Presumably, resort to a state law definition would be 
unnecessary if the point were to narrow access to Chapter 9, 
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for the state to want to broaden the definition of 
“municipality” as much as possible, since the 
state can always limit access through its 
authorizing power. A state agency should not be 
denied access to Chapter 9 simply because it has a 
novel purpose that may not comport with 
traditional municipal functions. 
On the other hand, technically, only the 
federal definition matters. That  definition 
cannot be expanded by state legislation, any more 
than any federal statute is subject  to 
modification by a state legislature. No state can 
expand the availability of Chapter 9 by redefining 
the term “municipality.” Regardless of any state 
law definition, it will ultimately always be up to 
a bankruptcy court to decide whether a particular 
debtor qualifies under federal law. A state law 
definition might be informative and persuasive to 
a bankruptcy court judge, but it cannot rewrite 
federal law. 
A list approach may be more effective. It 
would not redefine terms contained in the federal 
statute, but would merely provide a reference for 
the bankruptcy judge in her attempts to construe 
the terms “political subdivision” and “public 
agency or instrumentality” from federal law and 
decide whether a particular state-created entity 
qualifies. For example, some manifestation by the 
state that it considers a  county-created 
investment pool to be a state agency or 
instrumentality might be persuasive. 
This approach has limits, of course. It would 
be useful only when the entity at issue has some 
plausible claim to being a public entity. A 
private firm would not qualify, regardless of any 
state law spin. 
 
B. Nonprofit Corporations 
A question has been raised as to whether a 
nonprofit corporation that administers government- 
funded programs may be eligible for Chapter 9.173 
 
 
173. See Stan Ulrich, Bankruptcy Code: Chapter 9 Issues, Staff 
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Given that some or all of the assets of the 
nonprofit are either restricted grant funds or 
assets purchased with such funds, the basic 
concern is that the granting government agency be 
able to recover the assets, instead of having them 
used to satisfy the claims of general creditors.174 
The short answer to this inquiry is two-fold. 
First, nonprofit corporations generally do not 
qualify as municipalities, even if their sole 
activity is administering government-funded 
programs. Therefore, they are ineligible for 
Chapter 9. Second, concerns of the granting 
government agencies can adequately be addressed in 
Chapter 11, for which nonprofit corporations are 
clearly eligible. 
The basic statutory hurdle for such entities 
with respect to Chapter 9 is that because they are 
private entities, as opposed to government 
entities, they will generally fail to qualify as 
municipalities. What distinguishes a  public 
entity from a private one is that a public entity 
is subject to the control of some public 
authority.175 A nonprofit corporation will 
generally fail this test. While its grant funds 
may be subject to government control in the sense 
that uses of the funds are typically restricted by 
the terms of the applicable grants, that type of 
contractual restriction imposed by the government 
does not change the essentially private character 
of the corporation. Nonprofit corporations are 
ordinarily formed and controlled by private 




174. Telephone Interview with Colin W. Wied, Esq., former 
commissioner and chairperson, California Law Revision Commission 
(Mar. 7, 2000). 
175. See In re Westport Transit District, 165 B.R. 93, 95 (D. 
Conn. 1994) (ultimately dismissing petition because municipal 
entity was not authorized to file); In re Ellicott School 
Building Authority, 150 B.R. 261, 264 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992); In 
re Greene County Hospital, 59 B.R. 388, 389 (S.D. Miss. 1986) 
(citing Ex parte York County Natural Gas Authority, 238 F. Supp. 
964, 976 (W.D. S.C. 1965), modified, 362 F.2d 78 (4th  Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 970 (1966)). In Greene County Hospital, 
the court found that because a hospital was subject to control by 
a county board of supervisors, it qualified as a public agency. 
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managers and directors are private parties. 
Contracting with a government entity cannot 
transform the private entity into a public one. 
The special protections from federal court 
interference that Chapter 9 affords to municipal 
debtors are unnecessary for private corporations, 
which do not raise Tenth Amendment concerns.176 
Moreover, the use of a nonprofit for quasi- 
governmental purposes is sometimes driven by a 
desire to avoid certain state law restrictions 
that might apply to public agencies. The only 
published decision specifically addressed to this 
issue is In re Ellicott School Building 
Authority,177 which involved a nonprofit corporation 
whose main purpose was to engage in a lease 
financing arrangement for a school building. The 
debtor nonprofit corporation was formed to 
finance, construct, and own a school building that 
it would lease to Colorado School District 22. 
The debtor financed its land acquisition and 
construction with two bond issues.178 Use of a 
nonprofit corporation to issue the bonds was 
necessary in order to avoid state law requirements 
concerning voter approval for tax increases. 
Voters in the school district had earlier defeated 
a bond proposal that would have authorized a tax 
increase to finance the new school building.179 The 
debtor’s articles of incorporation required that 
the debtor’s directors be residents of the school 
district, but not elected officials or employees 
of the school district. The apparent purpose of 
this latter restriction was to assure that the 
nonprofit would not be considered the alter ego of 
the school district, and the debt would not be 
considered municipal debt subject to state law 
restrictions.180 Given this structuring and the 
point of forming the nonprofit in the first place, 
it would have been ironic if the debtor nonprofit 
 
 
176. See supra Part I. 
177. 150 B.R. 261 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992). 
178. The bonds were secured by a mortgage on the land and 
improvements and an assignment of the lease between the debtor 
and the school district.  See id. at 262. 
179. See id. at 263. 
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had subsequently been permitted to claim status as 
a public agency and avail itself of Chapter 9. 
While nonprofit corporations will not generally 
be eligible for Chapter 9, they are eligible for 
Chapter 11 reorganization—without the need for 
any state authorization181—and are accorded some 
advantages over their for-profit counterparts. 
Creditors cannot involuntarily place a nonprofit 
corporate debtor into bankruptcy.182 A nonprofit 
corporation’s Chapter 11 case cannot be converted 
to a Chapter 7 liquidation without its consent.183 
Perhaps most important for a nonprofit 
administering government-funded programs, the 
government funds may not necessarily be subject to 
creditors’ claims. To the extent that the 
government grants restrict the debtor’s uses of 
grant funds, the debtor may be deemed merely “an 
agent to carry out specified tasks” for the 
grantor.184 The case of Joliet-Will  County185 
involved grants that imposed “minute controls” on 
the use of government funds.186 The recipient had 
very little discretion: 
Each grant contains a budget specifying the items 
for which costs chargeable to the grant may be 
incurred and the amount that may be charged for 
each item. The grantee may not switch unused 
funds between items, and although he has title to 
any personal property bought with grant moneys he 
must reconvey to the government, if the 
government tells him to, every piece of property 
costing $1,000 or more. In these circumstances, 
the grantee’s ownership is nominal, like a 
trustee’s.187 
As such, the debtor is not a borrower from the 
granting agency but a trustee for the agency’s 
funds.  The funds are not the debtor’s property 
 
 
181. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994). 
182. See id. § 303(a). The Code does not specifically use the 
term “nonprofit.”  Instead, a nonprofit corporation is “a 
corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial 
corporation.”  Id. 
183. See id. § 1112(c). 
184. In re Joliet-Will County Community Action Agency, 847 F.2d 
430, 432 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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and are therefore not subject to creditors’ 
claims. Instead, they are assets of the granting 




I have proposed a discretionary system of state 
authorization that balances (a) the state’s 
interest in its financial health and the financial 
health  of  its  various  municipalities  with 
(b) individual municipalities’ interests in local 
autonomy. California’s authorization statute 
should place discretion with the governor  to 
decide whether and under what conditions a 
municipality may file for bankruptcy. His 
discretion should not be unlimited, but should be 
subject to guidelines that may vary depending on 
the type of municipality involved. 
By using bankruptcy authorization as a 
triggering mechanism for state involvement  in 
local financial distress, I hope to encourage 
early interaction between local and state 
officials and ultimately a cooperative approach to 























188. See id. 
